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Nonlocal character of quantum theory?
N. David Mermin
Laboratory of Atomic and Solid State Physics
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-2501
In a recent article under the above title (but without the question mark)
Henry Stapp presented arguments which lead him to conclude that under
suitable conditions “the truth of a statement that refers only to phenom-
ena confined to an earlier time” must “depend on which measurement an
experimenter freely chooses to perform at a later time.” I point out that
the reasoning leading to this conclusion relies on an essential ambiguity
regarding the meaning of the expression “statement that refers only to
phenomena confined to an earlier time” when such a statement contains
counterfactual conditionals. As a result the argumentation does not jus-
tify the conclusion that there can be frames of reference in which future
choices can affect present facts. But it does provide an instructive and
interestingly different opportunity to illustrate a central point of Bohr’s
reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.
I. Introduction.
Henry Stapp1 has subjected the strange quantum correlations discovered by Lucien
Hardy2 to a cunning logical analysis. In a series of fourteen propositions, each of which
appeals only to the predictions of quantum mechanics, formal logical transformations, or
one of three locality conditions, Stapp reaches a contradiction leading him to reject at
least one of the locality conditions and conclude that “the general causal principle that
the present facts are independent of free choices to be made at later times” cannot hold in
all Lorentz frames.
Many of Stapp’s propositions contain counterfactual conditionals — statements about
the outcome of experiments that might have been performed but were not. Such construc-
tions, Stapp emphasizes, are permissible provided they do nothing more than state the
consequences, for experiments that might have been performed but were not, of the ap-
plication of a specified set of theoretical assumptions to the actual outcome of an actual
1 Henry P. Stapp, “Nonlocal character of quantum theory,” Am. J. Phys. 65, 300-304
(1997).
2 Lucien Hardy, “Quantum mechanics, local realistic theories, and Lorentz invariant
realistic theories,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 2981-2984 (1992).
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experiment. As Stapp notes, counterfactual statements of this kind are “endemic in sci-
ence” and the wholesale rejection of all arguments containing such statements “is not
rational”.
Statements of this general kind are commonplace in physics: Theory
often allows one to deduce from the outcome of certain measurements on
a system what the outcome of some alternative possible measurements
would necessarily be.
The role of counterfactuals in his argument, then, is this:
[T]heoretical assumptions often allow one to say with certainty, on the
basis of the outcome of a certain experiment, what “would have hap-
pened” if an alternative possible apparatus had been used. If logical
arguments of this kind – that follow directly from certain theoretical
assumptions – lead to a contradiction, then one must, if rational, accept
the fact that at least one of the explicit or implicit theoretical assump-
tions is incorrect.
The theoretical assumptions to be tested in this way are the validity of the quantitative
predictions of quantum mechanics, Lorentz invariance, and certain specific conditions of
locality. Contingent on the validity of quantum mechanics, a contradiction would exclude
Lorentz invariance or locality.
Keeping in mind Stapp’s clear, convincing, and explicit characterization of the proper
role for counterfactual conditionals in physical reasoning, in Section III I point out an
essential ambiguity in the notion of “present facts” used to justify the step from the fifth
to the sixth of his fourteen propositions, that undermines the soundness of his conclusion.
Readers familiar with Stapp’s argument can go directly to Section III. Others may want
to look at Section II, where I provide the background necessary for the point I wish to
make. In Section IV I indicate how the nature of this hidden gap in Stapp’s tight and
subtle argument might offer some illumination to those who have difficulty3 understanding4
3 See for example John S. Bell, “Bertlmann’s socks and the nature of reality,” Appendix
1, in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge (1987), 155-156.
4 For a thoughtful critique of Bell’s statements about Bohr’s views, see Arkady Plotnit-
sky, Complementarity, Duke University Press (1994), 172-190.
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Bohr’s reply5 to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen6 (EPR).7
II. Background.
Stapp’s analysis of the data in the Hardy experiment is so cleverly constructed, so
economically stated, and so formally expressed, that it takes (or, more accurately, it took
me) a major effort to follow it. Those who make the effort will be rewarded by the beautiful
artistry of the construction. Because, however, the disabling ambiguity I wish to identify
occurs early in the argument, and because I am primarily interested here in the light
it sheds on Bohr’s reply to EPR, I give here a statement of the Hardy experiment (in
Stapp’s notation) that ought to permit a reader to follow the subsequent discussion of
that ambiguity (Section III) and its relation to Bohr’s reply to EPR (Section IV), without
having to master the subtleties of Stapp’s full argument or the earlier papers of Hardy.
Hardy’s experiment is of the EPR type: two correlated particles fly apart to two
experimental stations on the left (L) and right (R). At each station a property independent
of their orbital degrees of freedom (e.g. spin or polarization) is subject to one of two
alternative measurements (L1 or L2 on the left, and R1 or R2 on the right), each with two
possible outcomes (+ or −). The correlations in the outcomes of the four possible pairs of
measurements are encapsulated in the two-particle state, given (to within a normalization
constant) by
|Ψ〉 = |L1+, R1−〉 − |L2−, R2+〉 〈L2−, R2 + |L1+, R1−〉. (1)
Here a state such as |L1+, R1−〉 indicates a simultaneous eigenstate of the commuting
observables L1 and R1 with eigenvalue + on the left and − on the right.
Note that the state |Ψ〉 has been constructed to be orthogonal to the state |L2−, R2+〉:
〈L2−, R2 + |Ψ〉 = 0. (2)
5 Niels Bohr, “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered
complete?”, Phys. Rev. 48, 696-702 (1935).
6 Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, “Can quantum-mechanical de-
scription of physical reality be considered complete?”, Phys. Rev. 47, 777-780 (1935).
7 From a somewhat different perspective and within a broader treatment of Stapp’s
argument, W. Unruh identifies essentially the same weakness (in his discussion of Stapp’s
“LOC2”) in “Is quantum mechanics non-local?”, quant-ph 9710032. My interest here is in
the remarkable way Bohr’s critique of EPR is clarified by applying it to Stapp’s argument.
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Furthermore each of the two terms in (1) is easily seen to be orthogonal to either of the
states |L1−, R2−〉 or |L2+, R1+〉:
〈L1−, R2− |Ψ〉 = 0, (3)
〈L2+, R1 + |Ψ〉 = 0. (4)
Finally, because the observables 1 and 2 are non-trivially different on both left and right,
|Ψ〉 is not orthogonal to |L1−, R1+〉:
〈L1−, R1 + |Ψ〉 6= 0, (5)
The implications of (2), (3), and (4) are, respectively, that neither 22−+, 12−−, nor
21++, can occur. (By a symbol like 21+− I mean that experiment 2 is performed on the
left and experiment 1, on the right, with results + on the left and − on the right.) The
implication of (5) is that 11–+ can occur. Putting this in terms of joint probabilities,
p(12−−) = 0, (6)
p(22−+) = 0, (7)
p(21 + +) = 0, (8)
p(11−+) 6= 0. (9)
These four probabilities are the only features of the Hardy state needed for an understand-
ing of what follows. The consequences of (6)-(9) that Stapp requires for his analysis are
these:
If experiment 1 is performed on the left and the outcome is − then if
experiment 2 is performed on the right the outcome must be + [required
by (6)].
If experiment 2 is performed on the right and the outcome is + then if
experiment 2 is performed on the left the outcome must be + [required
by (7)].
If experiment 2 is performed on the left and the outcome is + then if
experiment 1 is performed on the right the outcome must be − [required
by (8)].
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If experiment 1 is performed on the left and the outcome is − then if
experiment 1 is performed on the right the outcome may be + [allowed
by (9)]
For ease in referring back to them I summarize these four assertions (listing the compact
summaries in the same order) by:
L1− =⇒ R2+, (10)
R2+ =⇒ L2+, (11)
L2+ =⇒ R1−, (12)
L1− =⇒/ R1− . (13)
Note that a superficial glance the first three of the four assertions suggest that since
L1+ implies R2+, R2+ implies L2+, and L2+ implies R1−, simple logic requires that
L1+ implies R1−, which contradicts the fourth. This, of course, is wrong, for these are
assertions about the outcomes of four different possible experiments (12, 22, 21, and 22)
only one of which can actually be done. At most one of them can be valid. It is nonsense
to reason in this way from all four at once, and Stapp does not do this.
What he does try to do, interestingly, is to set this crude intuition in a context that
allows the logic suggested by the superficial glance to operate legitimately, even though
only one of the four experiments can actually be done on any given pair of particles. He
gains the necessary freedom to maneuver by considering the case in which the decisions
of which measurement to make on both left and right, along with the performance and
recording of the outcomes of those measurements, are confined to space-like separated
regions of space-time. Lorentz invariance then requires that any facts, valid in a frame of
reference in which the choice and outcome of an experiment on one side happens before
the choice and outcome on the other side, must have a valid formulation in a frame in
which the time order is reversed. The goal of this strategy is to reduce all statements
about the measurements that might have been made but were not, to deductions that
exploit the general principle (locality) that decisions about which measurement to make
on one side, cannot alter the factual status of an earlier choice, performance, and outcome
of a measurement on the other side. If one could achieve this goal, then the resulting
contradiction would justify Stapp’s claim, cited above, about present facts depending on
future choices.
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III. What’s wrong
Because the choice, performance, and outcome of the measurement on one side can be
regarded as taking place either before or after the space-like-separated choice, performance,
and outcome of the measurement on the other side, all statements about any of these events
must have a valid formulation from either point of view, or in frame-independent atemporal
terms. For example the feature summarized by (10) can be stated atemporally as
If 1 is measured on the left with the result − then if 2 is measured on
the right the result must be +.
Or it can be stated as
If 1 was measured on the left with the result − then if 2 is subsequently
measured on the right the result must be +.
Or it can be stated as
If 1 is measured on the left with the result − then if 2 was earlier
measured on the right the result must have been +.
Bearing this in mind, consider Stapp’s fifth proposition, which translated out of his
formal notation into everyday language states (in atemporal terms) that
(I) Whenever the choice of measurement on the left is L2, if the measure-
ment on the right is R2 and gives +, then if R1 were instead performed
the result would be −.
(The “were” here is the “were” of the present subjunctive — not the past indicative.) The
validity of this is established by translating it into the language appropriate to the frame
of reference in which the events on the left happen first:
(IL) Whenever the choice of measurement on the left was L2, if the
measurement done later on the right is R2 and gives +, then if R1 were
instead done later on the right, the result would have to be −.
To see that (IL) is correct, note that it states that L2 was performed on the left, but does
not specify the outcome. If subsequently R2 is performed on the right and gives +, this
enables us to deduce from (11) that the result of the earlier measurement L2 must have
been +. This in turn enables us to deduce from (12) that if the choice at R had been to
measure 1, the result would certainly have been −.
The use here of a counterfactual conditional is entirely in accord with Stapp’s criterion
for its legitimacy. It is based on the outcome of an actual experiment (the measurement
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of L2 on the left with the outcome +) and a theoretical assumption (the validity of the
quantum mechanical calculation that the joint probability of L2+ and R1− in the Hardy
state is zero.)
Note next that Lorentz invariance requires (I) to be valid when stated in a language
appropriate to a frame in which the events on the right happen first:
(IR) Whenever the choice of measurement on the left is L2, if the
measurement done earlier on the right was R2 and gave +, then if R1
had instead been done earlier on the right, the result would necessarily
have been −.
The only thing preventing one from establishing (IR) directly by essentially the same
argument that established (IL), is the objection that there are no compelling grounds for
assuming that the result of the later experiment on the left in the hypothetical case (R1
performed earlier on the right) should be the same as the actual result in the actual case
(R2 performed earlier on the right). This objection is blocked, however, by the fact that
it makes no sense in the frame in which the experiment on the left happens first, and that
the recorded result of an actual experiment is a Lorentz invariant piece of information.
Now comes the crucial step to Stapp’s sixth proposition [called here (II)]. That propo-
sition is the same as the fifth [(I) above] except that L2 has been changed to L1:
(II) Whenever the choice of measurement on the left is L1, if the mea-
surement on the right is R2 and gives +, then if R1 were instead per-
formed the result would be −.
If we can legitimately get to (II), then the rest is almost a mopping up operation. Infor-
mally, suppose the result of that L1 measurement happens to be − (which (9) ensures has
a non-zero probability). Then (10) guarantees that the result of the measurement of R2
on the right must be +, and (II) then tells us that if R1 were instead performed on the
right the result would be −. The desired contradiction comes from (13), which tells us
that the result L1− need not necessarily be accompanied by R1−. There is, to be sure,
some tricky terrain to traverse in making these further informal steps airtight, but Stapp
brings considerable ingenuity to bear on that task. I do not explore here whether there
are further pitfalls, because the move from (I) to (II) is already unsupportable, and for
interesting reasons.
Stapp’s justification for the move from (I) to (II) is based on viewing (I) in the language
of the frame in which the events on the right happen first — i.e. taking (I) in the form
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(IR) given above. Consider now the phrase appearing in (IR),
(S) if the measurement done earlier on the right was R2 and gave +,
then if R1 had instead been done earlier on the right, the result would
necessarily have been −.
Stapp asserts that this refers only to the state of affairs on the right at times prior to
the choice of what measurement to make on the left. Since everything of interest on the
right takes place before the choice and execution of the experiment on the left, and since
“the truth of a statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time cannot
depend upon which measurement an experimenter will freely choose to perform at a later
time”, it is permissible to replace L2 with L1.
The problem with this justification for the replacement of L2 with L1 is that it goes
beyond Stapp’s criterion for the proper use of counterfactual conditionals. The first part
of (S),
(S1) R2 was performed earlier and gave +,
does refer to an actual event on the right prior to the choice of experiment on the left,
and it does indeed make no sense to claim that its meaning or validity depends on that
subsequent choice. But the rest of the statement (S),
(S2) if R1 had been performed earlier instead it would have given −,
is quite another matter. This is a counterfactual conditional. Unlike the meaning and
validity of (S1), the meaning and validity of (S2) do not derive directly from an actual
performance of R1 giving the actual result −. As a counterfactual conditional it only has
meaning as an inference from actual results of actual experiments in combination with
theoretical principles. One piece of information going into that inference is what actually
happened on the right (R2 was performed and gave the result +). So far so good. But the
other fact, required to make that inference, is that the subsequent choice of experiment
on the left turns out, in fact, to be L2. You cannot make the inference asserted by the
counterfactual conditional if the subsequent choice of experiment on the left turns out to
be L1. A statement about the outcome of an experiment at a given time that might have
been performed but in fact was not, may derive its truth or falsity and, indeed, its very
meaning from events in the future that have not yet happened. The statement (S2) and
hence the full statement (S) implicitly does refer to a choice taking place on the left at the
later time.
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Overlooking this difficulty in the passage from (I) to (II), Stapp takes his additional
steps to the final contradiction, and concludes that at least in some frames of reference the
truth of a statement referring only to phenomena confined to an earlier time can depend
on which measurement an experimenter freely chooses to perform at a later time. This
does not mean, however, that a choice made in the future (whether to measure L1 or L2
on the left) can influence events in the present. What it does mean is that a choice made
in the future can influence statements about events in the present that might have happened
but did not. It is this that prohibits the step from (I) to (II). The choice of experiment on
the left cannot affect what actually happened in the past on the right. But it can affect the
kinds of inferences one can make about hypothetical behavior on the right. Such inferences
are required to give meaning to a counterfactual conditional according to Stapp’s own rule.
IV. Bohr’s Reply to EPR
This refutation of Stapp’s nonlocality argument is strikingly evocative of Bohr’s reply
to EPR:
[T]here is . . . no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system
under investigation . . . [but] there is essentially the question of an influ-
ence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions
regarding the future behavior of the system.
This fragment of his longer article is virtually the entire point of his earlier very brief
response,8 where he puts it this way:
It is true that in the measurements under consideration any direct me-
chanical interaction of the system and the measuring agencies is ex-
cluded, but a closer examination reveals that the procedure of measure-
ments has an essential influence on the conditions on which the very
definition of the physical quantities in question rests.
In the case of Stapp’s argument there is no possibility of the subsequent choice of
measurement on the left having an effect on the earlier choice, performance, or outcome of
the measurement on the right. But that choice on the left does have an influence on the
condition that defines the very meaning of counterfactual statements about what might
have happened earlier on the right. Since there are no grounds for imposing on counterfac-
tual statements a requirement that they derive their meaning solely from conditions at or
8 Niels Bohr, “Quantum mechanics and physical reality”, Nature 136, 65 (1935)
9
prior to the time to which they refer, we see that Stapp’s argumentation does not justify
his conclusion that “phenomena confined to an earlier time” can in some Lorentz frame
depend upon which measurement an experimenter will freely choose to perform at a later
time.
The illustration of Bohr’s remark through Stapp’s argument makes clear that in deny-
ing the existence of a “mechanical disturbance” while maintaining the existence of an “influ-
ence” Bohr is in no way asserting the presence of a mysterious non-mechanical disturbance
(“quantum nonlocality”). In Stapp’s analysis of the Hardy experiment, the influence of
the choice of what to measure on the left only is only an influence on whether or not a
counterfactual statement about events happening entirely on the right has any meaning.
Stapp’s argument does not demonstrate nonlocality because that choice of what to mea-
sure on the left alters no thing on the right — i.e. it is “not a mechanical disturbance.”
What it does alter is what we can meaningfully say about events on the right — i.e. it is an
influence on the conditions that permit us to make a meaningful counterfactual statement.
In comparing this analysis of Stapp to Bohr’s analysis of EPR one encounters an
interesting difference in the time order of corresponding events. (Stapp, of course, uses
both time orders, but the justification offered for the crucial replacement of L2 with L1
is argued in the frame in which the event on the right happens first.) In EPR the choice
of what to measure on one side influences not the ability to talk counterfactually about a
past measurement on the other side, but the ability to make a prediction about a future
measurement on the other side. The prediction that EPR lose the ability to make as a
result of making a different past choice, corresponds to the past counterfactual Stapp loses
the ability to give meaning as a result of making a different future choice. It is easier to
grasp the point corresponding to Bohr’s in the context of Stapp’s argument than in the
context of EPR, because we are used to thinking of counterfactuals as mere statements
not necessarily about anything real. Predictions with certainty on the other hand — even
those that our present actions prevent us from being able to make — we are tempted, with
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, to view as statements about elements of reality.
In Stapp’s case a different choice of what to measure on one side has an influence
on the very conditions which define the possible types of valid counterfactual statements
regarding the past behavior of the system. In the EPR case a different choice of what to
measure on one side has “an influence on the very conditions which define the possible
types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system” on the other side. In
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both cases the influence is not on a far away actual state of affairs, but on our ability to
make valid statements about that far away state of affairs. A counterfactual is validated
by two things: a past event (the actual measurement whose result is required to confirm
the counterfactual) and the right future choice of measurement (that makes possible the
theoretical deduction). A prediction is validated by two things: a future event (the actual
measurement whose result is required to confirm the prediction) and the right past choice
(that makes possible the prediction).
By bringing us full circle from Bell and Hardy all the way back to EPR and Bohr,
but with an interesting twist, Stapp has provided us with a wonderful opportunity to
understand better and to savour more fully, the extraordinary content of that profoundly
subtle exchange.
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